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On 12 December 2015, the 195 Parties to the United 
Nations (UN) climate regime adopted the ‘Paris 
Agreement’ at their 21st Conference of the Parties (COP 
21). The adoption of this treaty for the period after 2020 
ended a reform process started in Durban, South Africa, 
in late 2011. The Agreement prominently contains the 
objective of holding “global average temperature to 
well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and to pursue 
efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above 
pre-industrial levels”. Hailed by many observers as a 
turning point that marks the beginning of the end of the 
fossil fuel era, the Agreement is above all the fruit of a 
compromise that allowed all Parties to claim victory. Its 
provisions, as many Parties and observers also 
acknowledged, will need to be stringently 
operationalised and implemented in order to stand a 
chance of actually attaining the temperature objective. 
The European Union (EU), which played a very 
constructive role during the negotiations leading to the 
Agreement, can become instrumental in keeping up the 
pressure for implementing it and preserving the ‘spirit 
of Paris’ over the coming years. Based on a synthesis of 
the Agreement, the process that led to its adoption and 
the EU’s role in that process, this Policy Brief discusses 
what the Agreement means for the EU’s internal and 
external climate policies and related policies.  
 
The Paris Agreement - a triumph of pragmatism 
The Paris Agreement is composed of two documents: a 
20-page decision of the COP, to which the actual 12-page 
Agreement is annexed. The latter contains the following 
key provisions: 
• Ambition: The Agreement enshrines the three-fold 
global goal of (i) keeping global warming “well below 
2°C above pre-industrial levels and to pursue efforts 
to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C” (Art. 2), (ii) 
peaking emissions “as soon as possible” (Art. 4.1), and 
(iii) achieving a balance of emissions and sinks by the 
second half of this century (Art. 4.1). 
• Differentiation (Art. 4): All countries participate in 
mitigation through ‘Nationally Determined 
Contributions’ (NDCs), to be ratcheted up every five 
years; developed countries adopt absolute emission 
reduction targets, while developing countries “are 
encouraged to move over time towards economy-
wide emission reduction or limitation targets in the 
light of different national circumstances”. 
Executive Summary 
> The Paris climate summit in December 2015 
resulted in an Agreement that pragmatically 
combines the science-driven demand for 
ambitious global emissions reduction objectives 
with key Parties’ continued desire to protect 
their sovereignty. Its implementation will 
depend on a quasi-constant negotiation process 
over the coming years. 
> The constructive role played by the European 
Union during the negotiations of this Agreement 
allowed it to recover from the reputational 
damage suffered at the 2009 Copenhagen 
summit. 
> Over the coming years, the EU will need to 
sustain and reinforce this role to contribute to 
ensuring the environmentally effective 
implementation of the Agreement. 
> To this end, both EU internal and external 
climate policies and related policies need to be 
strategically geared toward a high level of 
ambition, based on solid support and ownership 
from its member states. 
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• Finance (Art. 9): Developed countries shall provide 
finance for developing countries, whereas other 
countries can provide climate finance voluntarily. The 
COP decision speaks of at least 100bn USD to be 
mobilised per year until 2025 and an increased 
amount thereafter. 
• Transparency (Art. 13): An “enhanced transparency 
framework for action and support, with built-in 
flexibility which takes into account Parties’ different 
capacities” is to be established. To this end, the first 
meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement shall 
“adopt common modalities, procedures and 
guidelines, as appropriate”. 
 
Squaring the circle 
With these main outcomes, the Agreement reconciles the 
most diverse party preferences, combining a top-down 
approach of global goal-setting with a bottom-up exercise 
of ‘pledge and review’.  
On the one hand, the Agreement defines the ultimate 
objective of the UN climate regime. Where the 1992 UN 
Framework Convention on Climate Change had rather 
nebulously called for the “stabilization of greenhouse gas 
concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would 
prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the 
climate system” (Art. 2), the Paris Agreement now for the 
first time indicates that Parties consider this level to 
correspond to a temperature increase below 2°C above 
pre-industrial levels, and that it might even be preferable 
to limit this increase to 1.5°C. While the 2°C objective 
reflects a long-standing position of the EU, first codified 
in the 2009 Copenhagen Accord, the reference to the 
1.5°C aim represents a strong demand of especially the 
small island nations and least developed countries. On 
the other hand, the Agreement enshrines a bottom-up 
approach that was equally first introduced with the 
Copenhagen Accord, namely that Parties submit NDCs 
which are binding only in national law. This desire to 
protect their national sovereignty had been most strongly 
expressed by the United States and the emerging 
economies, especially China and India.  
 
The Agreement thus re-designs the architecture of the 
global climate regime by essentially multilateralising 
unilateral action. Purely national (or in the EU’s case 
regional) commitments are subsumed under a common, 
aspirational goal, as well as – yet to be defined – common 
reporting and assessment rules. Differentiation and the 
decade-long ‘firewall’ separating developed countries 
from developing countries have generally been 
weakened by the fact that all Parties will in the future be 
bound to adopt NDCs. Nevertheless the Agreement 
remains, in the words of US Secretary of State Kerry, “a 
monument to differentiation”, through its explicit 
reference to the principle of common, but differentiated 
responsibilities (Art. 2.2), but also via differentiation in 
the form of NDCs and on finance. In combining positions 
that seemed previously incommensurable, the 
Agreement represents a triumph of pragmatism within 
the climate regime. Its bindingness heavily relies on the 
legitimacy that comes from the wide support it enjoyed 
and is underpinned by a quasi-general submission of 
NDCs by Parties. The main compliance mechanism will 
therefore be ‘naming and shaming’ based on a stringent 
application of a robust transparency framework. 
 
The beginning of the end of the fossil fuel era?  
From the institutional incrementalist perspective that has 
characterised the global climate regime ever since its 
inception, the Agreement can be viewed as an 
unexpected success demonstrating the resilience of the 
multilateral system. Its environmental effectiveness 
remains however to be proven. Currently, the top-down 
component of the Agreement embodied in the “well 
below 2°C” aspiration stands in stark contrast to its 
bottom-up features, above all the level of ambition of the 
(intended) contributions. The NDCs submitted by 
December 2015, if duly implemented, are bound to lead 
to a temperature increase of at least 2.7°C (see below). 
At the same time, the broad support for the Agreement is 
expected to provide for a strong ‘signaling effect’ for 
public and private actors alike that they should prepare 
for the end of the fossil fuel era. 
Ambition gap under Intended Nationally Determined 
Contributions submitted by COP 21 
 
Source: Climate Action Tracker, 8 December 2015, 
www.climateactiontracker.org/ 
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As many of its provisions remain imprecise, including the 
crucial section on transparency, the Paris Agreement 
provides not just the endpoint of the reform process 
kicked off in Durban, but also the starting point of quasi-
constant negotiations over the coming years. These 
negotiations will have to further define and 
operationalise the architecture of the post-2020 climate 
regime in the newly founded Ad Hoc Working Group on 
the Paris Agreement (APA) and at future COPs. Moreover, 
Parties will, besides ratifying the Agreement, also 
individually need to adopt, implement and transparently 
report on NDCs so as to attain the key objective of the 
treaty. The process started at Paris is therefore again 
bound to become arduous. To effectively implement the 
Agreement, it is quintessential that Parties manage to 
preserve both their ambitions and the willingness to 
compromise displayed in Paris. The task of facilitating 
future talks rests on those who considerably contributed 
to shaping the Agreement – among them the French COP 
Presidency (in office until COP 22) and the EU. 
Success factors and the role of the EU in the 
negotiations on the Paris Agreement 
Six years after the infamous Copenhagen summit (COP 
15) that had resulted in a minimalistic ‘Accord’ and saw 
the EU sidelined during the final bargain, the UN climate 
regime delivered a legally binding outcome, and the EU 
was an integral part of the deal-making process in Paris.  
Getting to ‘yes’: lessons learned and creative coalitions 
To avoid reproducing the Copenhagen experience, the 
COP Presidencies of Peru and France had meticulously 
prepared COP 21 as an ‘anti-COP 15’. Expectations had 
been lowered through able media strategies, procedures 
had been made more transparent and party-driven, 
heads of state had been invited to give guidance and 
large-scale climate finance initiatives involving public and 
private actors (e.g. the ‘Breakthrough Energy Coalition’ 
involving 20 governments and major investors such as Bill 
Gates) had been announced at the beginning of the 
summit instead of at its end. All this allowed for 
demonstrating broad support for climate action from 
various actors, ranging from national, regional and local 
governments to civil society and the private sector.  
Moreover, COP 15 had demonstrated a power shift away 
from the industrialised countries in general to the US and 
the emerging economies (BASIC – Brazil, South Africa, 
India, China). The US, with reinvigorated climate 
leadership during President Obama’s second term, and 
China had already in 2014 found common ground on the 
overarching form of the future agreement. The desire of 
these powerhouses for a loose bottom-up framework 
was counterbalanced in Paris by a strong ‘High Ambition 
Coalition’ of more progressive players, including the small 
island states, a multitude of other developing countries 
and the EU, pushing essentially for a legally binding, 
ambitious and dynamic agreement with a clear long-
term, science-based goal and a review mechanism. This 
group had formed before COP 21, was approached and 
joined by the US during the summit, and later even by 
Brazil, breaking ranks with the BASIC group in what was 
described by some as a ‘game-changer’ for the talks. 
The EU’s new climate pragmatism 
In the negotiation process that led to the Paris 
Agreement, the EU played a non-negligible role, 
displaying an unprecedented level of pragmatism in its 
climate diplomacy. Already at the 2011 Durban COP, the 
EU’s engagement, based on a coalition with progressive 
developing country Parties, had been instrumental in 
setting the agenda for the regime reform talks. In the 
run-up to Paris, the Union then operated with its firm 
support for a legally binding outcome, but also generally 
lowered levels of ambition and a more flexible approach. 
First, its own climate policies, including a 40% emissions 
reduction target for 2030 (from 1990 levels) and resulting 
from difficult internal negotiations remained clearly 
below earlier ambitions to ‘lead by example’. Second, the 
EU’s general objectives, as outlined in the September 
2015 Environment Council conclusions, were much more 
dynamic than in the past. They included – apart from the 
2°C goal – a five-yearly ‘ambition mechanism’ for an 
upward adjustment of such commitments, and, without 
much specification as to what this would entail, a robust 
common rules-based transparency regime. Third, and in 
stark contrast to past negotiation rounds, the EU was 
more prudent in formulating specific expectations 
regarding other Parties’ efforts, which were to be judged 
“in light of different national circumstances and evolving 
economic realities and capabilities”. Fourth, and in terms 
of its outreach strategy, during COP 21 its major 
contribution consisted in co-sponsoring the above-
mentioned ‘High Ambition Coalition’, based on a pre-
existing cooperation with the small island states, which 
was enlarged to the countries of the African, Caribbean 
and Pacific (ACP) group. When the US and Brazil joined 
towards the end of the COP, the Group received 
significant media attention and demonstrated its 
commitment to achieving an ambitious outcome by 
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jointly marching into the plenary meeting during which 
the final draft outcome of the Agreement was presented.  
Many provisions in the Agreement, including the level of 
ambition and the demand for a robust transparency 
framework, correspond rather closely to the EU’s post-
COP 15 wish list. This was also highlighted in statements 
of the European Commissioner for Climate Action and 
Energy Cañete, the Luxembourg Presidency of the Council 
and many other EU member state representatives. They 
also acknowledged shortcomings, however, and the need 
to further strengthen the post-2020 regime architecture. 
In the Commissioner‘s words: “Now, what has been 
promised must be delivered. Europe will continue to lead 
the global low-carbon transition we have agreed.” 
Building on Paris - next steps for EU climate policies  
Commissioner Cañete set an ambitious agenda for the EU 
for the years to come. With its diplomatic performance 
during the negotiations, the EU has demonstrated its 
recovery from the traumatic Copenhagen experience. If 
the Union wants to pursue its constructive role in global 
climate politics and aim at promoting a high level of 
environmental protection, it can, however, not afford to 
rest on its laurels. The Paris Agreement represents above 
all a promise, whose delivery will depend on continued 
action. One of the EU’s main tasks will be to defend the 
ambition embedded in the Agreement’s key objectives by 
preserving the ‘spirit of Paris’ via both internal and 
external climate policies as well as related policies. 
Doing its homework: the EU’s internal climate policies 
Besides a rapid ratification of the Paris Agreement, the 
outcome of COP 21 imposes if not a legal, then at least a 
political and moral obligation on the EU to consider 
reinforcing its internal climate policies for 2020 and 2030. 
Currently, the European Environment Agency projects 
that emissions in the EU will have been reduced by 24-
25% by 2020, exceeding the 20% target. Reinforcing its 
pre-2020 ambition seems thus feasible. It would provide 
a strong signal to other parties about the EU’s 
commitment to the climate cause. Moreover, and beyond 
striving to fulfil its intended NDC of 40% reductions by 
the year 2030, the Union should also reflect on whether 
and how to ratchet up this contribution already prior to 
that date. A first science-based global stock-taking 
exercise under the Paris Agreement is already foreseen 
for 2018. By then, the EU should have clarity on how it 
“will continue to lead the global low-carbon transition” in 
the medium to long term. 
To seize the opportunity for demonstrating its 
commitment to a long-term transition process towards a 
low-carbon society, existing intra-EU differences need to 
be settled. The litmus test for the member states’ 
willingness to support this transition will arguably be this 
year’s negotiations on the EU’s ‘effort-sharing’. The new 
Polish government has already voiced its desire for 
renegotiating the 40% target, which it considers as too 
ambitious. The Commission’s leadership ambition can 
also be questioned: Commissioner Cañete’s 
announcement at a press conference right after the Paris 
summit, that “it will be for the next Commission to lead” 
the process of discussing the EU’s post-2030 target seems 
to contradict his otherwise very ambitious rhetoric during 
COP 21. Given the importance of climate change for both 
EU internal and external policies, and especially the 
global signaling effect that its domestic policies in this 
domain will have during the ratification and 
operationalisation phase of the Paris Agreement, the EU 
would be well-advised not to postpone trend-setting 
decisions to the future. The Energy Union project, which 
stipulates a parallel development of EU energy and 
climate policies, should provide ample opportunities for 
trade-offs allowing to solve conflicts between the more 
and the less progressive member states. 
Reinforcing EU climate diplomacy 
While COP 21 was hailed as a success of EU external 
climate policies, there is no time for complacency for 
Europe’s climate diplomats. Paris may have been a peak 
followed by the valleys of regular APA negotiations and 
less high-profile COPs, but the devil is in the detail. The 
negotiations on the implementation of the Paris 
Agreement will require the EU to operate with a clear-cut 
strategy. In a context where the implementation of the 
regime relies heavily on ‘naming and shaming’, the EU 
will, on the one hand, need to operate with clear 
positions regarding the operationalisation of crucial 
components of the regime, especially its future 
transparency framework. On the other hand, it will again 
need to closely cooperate with the COP Presidencies of 
France and Morocco, build coalitions, but also reach out 
to those Parties that may have diverging viewpoints (e.g. 
China, India), and make targeted use of financial and 
other incentives to preserve the level of ambition 
displayed in Paris during the ratification and 
operationalisation stages. Helping developing countries 
to propose and implement solid NDCs could be a one 
cornerstone of the EU’s future climate diplomatic 
strategy. Such a strategy could, especially in the UN 
framework, again be formulated and defended primarily 
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by the apparently very well-functioning cooperation 
between ‘team EU’, led by the Commission and several 
lead negotiators in cooperation with the Council 
Presidency, and the member states. At the same time, 
when it comes to strategy-building and bi- and 
multilateral outreach beyond the UN, the experience of 
the French COP Presidency, aptly steered by Foreign 
Minister Fabius and his ministry in cooperation with 
Environment Minister Royal, has demonstrated the value 
added that can come from close cooperation between 
generalist diplomats and climate experts. The EU as a 
whole could equally stand to gain from reinforcing this 
type of cooperation, making more stringent use of the 
diplomatic networks of EU Delegations and member state 
embassies for getting key messages. An effective 
monitoring of the ratification and implementation 
processes of the Paris Agreement in third countries 
would also permit swift reactions to any attempts at 
rolling back the achievements of COP 21.  
Integrating climate change into other EU external policies 
Climate change has developed into a cross-cutting 
challenge for EU foreign policy that touches on multiple 
other external policies, among them development, 
energy, migration, trade and security policies. To 
implement the terms of the Paris Agreement, activities in 
other than purely climate-related fora (e.g. G7, G20) and 
comprehensive contacts with public and private actors 
beyond the EU will be necessary. The Union should 
therefore take its environmental integration principle 
(Art. 11 TFEU) seriously, and embed climate change even 
more firmly across the entire portfolio of external 
relations, including through a strategic upgrade of the 
EU’s Green Diplomacy Network. To do so, High 
Representative Mogherini and, the Foreign Affairs 
Council should be allowed greater co-ownership of the 
policy. In full recognition of its multiple interlinkages with 
other areas of EU external and security policies, climate 
change should also be given a prominent place in the 
EU’s forthcoming ‘Global Strategy’.  
Committing member states to an ambitious EU climate 
agenda 
To enable the EU to follow up on all these points and 
“lead the global low-carbon transition”, internal 
coherence between its members remains a crucial 
precondition. This implies that member states will need 
to recognise the immense potential that lies in jointly 
developing the EU’s climate and energy policies. If this is 
done effectively through internal and external policies, 
the EU will not only contribute to reducing the pressures 
from climate change as an environmental challenge and 
‘threat multiplier’, but also enhance its energy 
independence, seize the economic opportunities 
associated with a low-carbon transition and gain in global 
prestige. Acknowledging these opportunities implies 
assuming much-needed joint ownership of the EU’s 
climate policies in the years to come. 
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